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In 1982, Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi security forces into al-
Dujail, a town sixty kilometers north of Baghdad, as reprisal for a
failed assassination attempt. Hundreds of townspeople were
detained and tortured while buildings and crops in the town were
destroyed. 2  One hundred and forty-eight people were allegedly
executed .
In the 1988 Anfal campaigns against the Kurds in northern Iraq,
Iraqi army commander Ali Hassan al-Majid, or "Chemical Ali," set
out "to solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs., 4 At
the behest of Hussein, thousands of noncombatants were abducted or
killed, 2,000 villages were destroyed, and chemical weapon attacks on
the town of Halabja killed thousands
In the wake of the United States invasion of Iraq and the
subsequent capture of Hussein, it was paramount to hold Hussein and
the members of the ruling Ba'ath party legally accountable for their
J.D. candidate, May 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
would like to thank Prof. Naomi Roht-Arriaza for supporting the development of this
note and furthering my interest in transitional justice.
1. Human Rights Watch, The Iraqi High Tribunal and Representation of the




4. Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against
the Kurds, Human Rights Watch Report, (Jul., 1993), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfaU/ANFALINT.htm.
5. Id
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atrocities. A variety of transitional justice mechanisms were available
for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to choose from.
Instead of adopting an international tribunal mirroring the
mechanisms employed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda,6 the CPA opted
for a domestic tribunal that, while receiving United States support,
would allow the Iraqis themselves to try Hussein and members of the
Ba'ath party.7 The adoption of a domestic model has been heavily
criticized, with many critics suggesting that a hybrid tribunal, one
employing both domestic and international elements, should have
been employed! While the hybrid model has been somewhat
successful in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone, it has yet to be
employed in the context of a unilateral intervention such as Iraq.
Although hybrid models are theoretically superior in post-conflict
circumstances to both domestic and international tribunals, significant
challenges and shortcomings have emerged in their implementation.9
This note assesses whether the hybrid tribunal is a viable model
for post-conflict accountability in the aftermath of unilateral
intervention. Drawing from the experiences of the tribunals in
Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone as well as the challenges facing
the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), this note identifies how the unique
challenges of unilateral intervention impact the potential of hybrid
tribunals. Part II of this paper sets out the context and demands of
unilateral intervention and the need for legal accountability
mechanisms. Part III describes the various mechanisms available for
legal accountability and explains why the hybrid model has emerged
as the preferred approach. Part IV determines whether, and in what
form, the hybrid model is possible after unilateral intervention.
Finally, Part V examines whether the promised advantages of hybrid
6. Due to the temporal restriction, the International Criminal Court is not able
to hear issues prior to July 2002.
7. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 48, Delegation of Authority
Regarding an Iraqi Special Tribunal, (Dec. 09, 2003), available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD48_IST-and-Appendi
xA.pdf (visited Sept. 6, 2006).
8. David Gersh, Poor Judgment., Why the Iraqi Special Tribunal Is the Wrong
Mechanism for Trying Saddam Hussein on Charges of Genocide, Human Rights
Abuses, and Other Violations of International Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 273,
273 (2004).
9. See generally Laura Dickenson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts
and International Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059 (2003);
James Cockayne, Article: The Fraying Shoestring Rethinking Hybrid War Crime
Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 616 (2005); Suzanne Katzenstein, Note: Hybrid
Tribunals: Searching for Justice in East Timor, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 245 (2003).
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tribunals - increased legitimacy, capacity building, and international
norm diffusion - can be realized after unilateral intervention."0
II. Unilateral Intervention
Failed states and ethnic conflict have given rise to an alarming
number of mass atrocities in the last two decades. From the ethnic
cleansing in Yugoslavia to the genocide in Rwanda and the atrocities
committed in Iraq, the toll of human suffering has demanded the
attention of powerful nations. Unfortunately, coordinated
international efforts to prevent these atrocities have, at times, proven
woefully inadequate. In the absence of effective coordinated
international efforts, unilateral humanitarian intervention has been
posited as a necessary alternative." However, the prospect of
humanitarian intervention carries with it the fear that powerful states
will use the language of human rights to justify actions motivated
primarily by self-interest. 2  The debate over humanitarian
intervention, whether unilateral or not, is a hotly contested issue that
divides the human rights community. While the United States
intervention in Iraq has forced many to revisit and reconsider the
utility of humanitarian intervention, such an examination falls outside
the scope of this note. Despite the normative value of humanitarian
intervention, the increased prevalence of human rights in
international relations 3 ensures that unilateral interventions will
include the rhetoric of human rights even in actions motivated solely
by narrow state interests." The recent interventions in Kosovo,
Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that unilateral intervention is
likely motivated by some combination of humanitarian and strategic
interests.'5
10. Laura Dickenson, The Promise of Hybrid Tribunals, 97 AM.J.INT'L.L. 295,
296 (2003).
11. Nikolai Krylov, Article: Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons, 17 LoY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 365, 365-66 (1995).
12. Jeffrey Morton, The Legality of NA TO's Intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999.
Implications for the Progressive Development of International Law, 9 ILSA J. INT'L
& COmP. L. 75, 98 (2002).
13. Krylov, supra note 11, at 380.
14. Carsten Stahn, Enforcement of the Collective Will after Iraq, 97
AM.J.INT'L.L. 804, 808 (2003).
15. President Clinton justified intervention in Kosovo on three grounds: to avert
a humanitarian catastrophe, preserve stability in a key part of Europe, and maintain
the credibility of NATO. Morton, supra note 12, at 78. Intervention in Afghanistan
against the Taliban was based on claims of retribution, security, and liberating the
2006]
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Whether the motivation for unilateral intervention is altruistic or
self-interested, abusive former regimes must be held responsible
through legal accountability mechanisms. These mechanisms serve
several purposes: symbolic regime transfer, rule of law promotion,
justification of the intervention, and warning other despotic leaders
that human rights violations will not go unpunished. At their core,
post-intervention tribunals are show trials subject to both pejorative
and positive assessments." In the negative sense, they serve as legal
theater for the victor's justice, demonizing the accused and bestowing
suspect legitimacy upon the victor. 7 In the positive sense they allow a
society to condemn, and distance itself from the actions of the former
regime, and transition to a new regime guided by the rule of law. 8
"[H]olding the prior regime accountable presents the first real test for
the establishment of the rule of law" because of the spectacular
nature of the crimes, the figures involved, and the complexity of the
19
process.
The presence of a strong rule of law is essential to stability and
security." Tribunals are often the most visible measures taken to
establish the rule of law2' even though other extensive developments
are required.22 Unilaterally intervening actors are likely to employ a
tribunal because of the tremendous legitimacy a tribunal can confer in
the domestic arena. Taped proceedings and courtroom declarations
provide tangible evidence of transitional progress that is easily viewed
on the evening news. Similarly, tribunals create a historical record of
the former regime's actions that can justify the intervention.23
Tribunals also demonstrate to the international community that the
intervening actor is dedicated to the rule of law, which may dispel
Afghan people, particularly women, from the oppressive Taliban regime.
16. Ash Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and Ethics of Nation-
Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431,459 (2005).
17. Id,
18. Id.
19. Id. at 460-61.
20. Rosanna Lipscomb, Note. Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance
Transitional Justice: A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 182, 184 (2006).
21. Bali, supra note 16, at 460-61.
22. For example, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) operates at a level
below the IST. There has been significant international assistance, with a great
degree of United States assistance from the Department of Justice's Office of




lingering concerns about the motivation of an intervention. This is
even more important locally, where the presence of occupying forces
can spur significant suspicions as to the supposedly benevolent nature
of an intervention. It is highly likely that tribunals will be a part of
any future unilateral intervention due to the advantages that such
tribunals offer.
III. Available Tribunals
Although a variety of mechanisms are available for legal
accountability in the post-intervention context, each has distinct
shortcomings that negatively impact their efficacy. The recent use of
the hybrid model, which employs both domestic and international
elements, is an attempt to overcome the disadvantages of purely
domestic and purely international tribunals. The International
Criminal Court (ICC) has been criticized for its limited jurisdiction,
inability to develop local legal capacity, and removal from the situs of
the transgressions.24 Additionally, the ICC cannot address any actions
that occurred prior to 2002 because of its temporal restrictions.25
International tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) have been heavily criticized for similar reasons.26
Commonly referred to as "ad hoc" tribunals, international tribunals
are located outside of the country concerned and use international
judges to apply international law. Their visibility and impact on the
local populations has been less than ideal, which raises the question of
whether the trial benefits those who suffered the offenses or the
conscience of the international community.27 Ad hoc tribunals have
also been incredibly expensive and slow, causing "ad hoc fatigue" and
disfavor among diplomats and donor governments. 28
The alternative to expensive and removed international tribunals
is to use the legal mechanisms of the society where the offenses were
24. Lipscomb, supra note 20, at 195-96.
25. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 11, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome-Statute-l20704-EN.pdf.
(visited Sept. 28, 2006)
26. See generally, Cockayne, supra note 9.
27. Dickenson, supra note 9, at 1067.
28. "Where 'never again' was once the catch-cry of anti-impunity activists, it has
now become the under-the-breath muttering of Permanent Representatives on their
way to approving another tribunal budget at U.N. Headquarters in New York."
Cockayne, supra note 9, at 616-17.
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committed. However, limitations on the structure and legitimacy of
the domestic systems often preclude any transitional justice efforts.
The conflict that gave rise to the offenses often destroys the physical
infrastructure of the legal system and decimates personnel necessary
for any legal proceedings. Moreover, even if some measure of the
domestic legal system survives, it may lack the laws and experience to
adequately prosecute such widespread and egregious offenses. The
legitimacy of the domestic legal system is vital to any attempt at
accountability, but may be absent either because it was employed as a
mechanism for repression or because its personnel were complicit in
the offenses committed. 9 Transitional justice inherently implicates
divisive political interests. Left to its own devices, a domestic legal
system may not have the impetus to undertake such a daunting task.
The temptation to forgive and forget, an often counter-productive
strategy, is particularly strong when a widespread portion of the
society was complicit in the atrocities.
The hybrid model has been used in Kosovo, East Timor, and
Sierra Leone as an inexpensive alternative to the costly ad hoc
tribunals." The hybrid model employs international personnel and
law side by side with domestic personnel and law. The prosecution
and defense are comprised of local lawyers working with
international lawyers, and the judges apply domestic law that has
been adapted to incorporate international norms and standards." The
potential of the hybrid model is to:
[M]arry the best of two worlds - the expertise of the international
community with the legitimacy of local actors; but the risk is to
intermix the worst of both - the externality of international actors
with the weakness of local institutions which produced the violence
32in question.
Although the Kosovo tribunals were implemented to deal with
security and legitimacy issues, the motivation for implementing the
29. International Center for Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Center,
University of California, Berkeley, Iraqi Voices. Attitudes Toward Transitional
Justice and Social Reconstruction, 33-34 (May 19, 2004) [hereinafter ICTJ], available
at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/0/108.pdf (visited Sept. 15, 2006)
30. The court in Cambodia is also likely to employ the hybrid model, but
structural and funding problems have prevented the court from becoming
operational. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001,
http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/intro/intro15.html (visited Sept. 6, 2006)
31. Dickenson, supra note 9, at 1059.
32. Cockayne, supra note 9, at 618-19.
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other hybrid tribunals was to build the capacity of the domestic
system while doling out international justice cheaply.3 The promise
of hybrid tribunals, according to Laura Dickenson, lies in their ability
to garner greater legitimacy, develop the capacity of local legal system
and to incorporate international norms into local legal systems."
These measures allow a country to address egregious crimes and
provide its people with a stronger, more developed legal system to
provide stability in the future.
In practice, however, the theoretical potential of hybrid tribunals
has been somewhat less than forthcoming. Although preferable to
purely international or domestic tribunals, hybrid tribunals' promise
of cheap, legitimate justice that advances the domestic legal system
has not been fully realized. Lack of funding continues to be a chronic
issue, and the impact upon legitimacy, capacity, and international
norm diffusion remains unclear. 5 East Timor and Kosovo have had
significant personnel and infrastructure issues, and Sierra Leone,
perhaps the most successful to date, has had continued issues with
funding and delay.36
A hybrid tribunal has not yet been used in the wake of an
unilateral intervention. The NATO involvement in Yugoslavia, the
British involvement in Sierra Leone, and the Australian involvement
in East Timor do not reach the level of unilateralism that occurred in
Iraq.37 Although NATO acted without U.N. authorization in Kosovo,
it was comprised of regional actors that could lay claim to legitimacy."
Further, the hybrid tribunal in Kosovo was not the primary
mechanism of legal accountability, but served as a supplemental
mechanism to the ICTY.39 The involvement of troops from the
33. Kosovo employs a different model than either Sierra Leone or East Timor.
The Kosovo hybrid model is much more a supplement to the domestic legal system
than a conscious integration of domestic personnel into an international war crimes
tribunal. While in some cases this has increased the interaction of international and
domestic personnel, it has also resulted in international personnel being assigned to
mundane cases unrelated to significant crimes.
34. Dickenson, supra note 10, at 296.
35. Id. at 306.
36. Id. at 296-300; Cockayne, supra note 9, at 630-31.
37. Jamie O'Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and
Support Reconstruction in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American Leadership,
17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 219 (2004).
38. Dickenson, supra note 9, at 1060.
39. Id. at 1062-63. Although the actual interaction between the hybrid tribunals
and the ICTY have been very limited, there is no formal mechanism for referring
cases and interaction between the two levels is sparse.
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a
regional body, and the United Nations preceded the British
intervention in Sierra Leone.' In contrast, the war and
reconstruction in Iraq were largely executed under U.S. control, even
though the United States established a so-called "coalition of the
willing."
The context of unilateral intervention presents a variety of
challenges for transitional justice: questionable legitimacy, instability,
lack of international participation, and ulterior motives. However,
unilateral intervention also offers some advantages over collective
action: decisive action, military strength, and singular responsibility.
This note addresses the issue of whether, in the unique circumstances
of unilateral intervention, hybrid tribunals can fulfill their promise.
IV. Are Hybrids Feasible After Unilateral Intervention?
Although many called for a hybrid tribunal in Iraq," it is not
clear whether a hybrid model would have been a feasible or even
preferable option for accountability. The international reluctance to
become involved in the war was likely matched only by the
unwillingness of the United States to give up predominant control of
the effort. While the Security Council Resolution 148342 gave the
United States some international authority, the U.S. postwar strategy
was to govern Iraq directly as a belligerent occupant rather than cede
power to the United Nations.43 The lack of international participation
made the use of a hybrid tribunal unlikely.
A. Legitimacy
The first hurdle a hybrid tribunal faces in the aftermath of a
unilateral intervention is the de facto illegitimacy of the entire
project. Though not fatal to the project of transitional justice, a lack
of U.N. approval greatly impairs whether the international
community and the local population will see the action and any
subsequent accountability measures as legitimate.
A crucial element of the hybrid tribunal is its mixed international
aspect, which provides legitimacy and expertise. For example, the
40. O'Connell, supra note 37, at 221. In 2000, the United Kingdom sent troops to
Sierra Leone after the Revolutionary United Front captured 500 U.N. peacekeepers.
41. Gersh, supra note 8, at 288-89.
42. UNGA Resolution 1483, 20 May 2003, S/res/1483.
43. Bali, supra note 16, at 434.
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United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) incorporated
international judges into the domestic system to combat the risk of
bias and violent reaction to ethnically controversial cases." If an
unilateral intervention is seen as illegitimate, this will curtail
participation by other international actors in the post-conflict
situation. Hybrid tribunals with established international legitimacy
already have difficulty attracting and retaining experienced
international personnel.45 Without U.N. or regional legitimacy,
attracting the international personnel necessary for the hybrid model
to be effective will be even more difficult. Gaining the services of
qualified international personnel willing to work in an unstable
environment for an extended period of time is a much greater task
than cobbling together a coalition of the willing to contribute to a
military campaign. As the situation in Iraq keenly demonstrates,
winning the peace is far more difficult than wining the war.
Countries and organizations whose experiences would be vital to
the successful use of the hybrid model could withhold their support
out of fear of post hoc legitimatization of the unilateral intervention.
Some countries may withhold support in an effort to punish the
unilateral actor for its intervention. Less cynically, countries and
organizations may demonstrate that they cannot "pick up the pieces"
in an effort to dissuade future unilateral interventions and impress
upon the unilateral actor the difficulty of going it alone. Without
international legitimacy, there is a strong likelihood that instead of a
hybrid model, the post-conflict tribunal will appear more like the IST:
locally operated, with the United States providing significant behind
the scenes help.
Although countries and organizations may be willing to offer
their support after the intervention despite the lack of legitimacy,
such efforts may not be feasible. Though post-intervention
participation may be motivated by genuine concern for the local
population, the significant danger of being associated with the
unilateral actor remains. As Iraq tragically demonstrated, this
association can have dire consequences. On August 19, 2003, Sergio
Viera de Mello, the U.N. Special Representative to Iraq, was killed
44. Tom Periello & Marieke Wierda, International Center for Transitional
Justice, Lessons From the Deployment of International Judges and Prosecutors in
Kosovo, 13 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter ICTJ-K], available at
http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Kosovo.study.pdf (visited Sept.15, 2006).
45. Cockayne, supra note 9, at 632-634.
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along with many others when insurgents bombed the U.N.
headquarters in Iraq.46 De Mello was widely respected for his
expertise and passion for transitional justice for playing a significant
part in the U.N. efforts in Kosovo, Cambodia, and East Timor." His
death and the subsequent attacks on U.N. personnel led to the U.N.
withdrawal from Iraq 8 The attacks suggest that even a legitimate
organization cannot operate in the aftermath of an unilateral
intervention without being negatively associated with the intervener."
The post hoc involvement of legitimate international actors, while
crucial to the success of a hybrid tribunal, may not be possible in the
aftermath of an illegitimate unilateral intervention.
A failure to attract international legitimacy may also make it
difficult for the local population to accept the hybrid tribunal.
However, broad international support could influence the local
population to perceive the tribunal as more legitimate. For example,
Sierra Leone's initial resistance to the U.S. involvement with the
Special Court has been attributed to the United States' unilateral
actions in Iraq. °
Participation by international states and states with "similar
cultures" could potentially relieve some of the colonial tension
associated with intervention. However, international legitimacy does
not necessarily translate to domestic legitimacy. A study conducted
by the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Human
Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley (ICTJ),
suggests that international and regional support would not have
increased local acceptance of a tribunal in Iraq.5 The ICTJ study
46. Stanley Roberts, Note: Socio-Religious Obstacles to Judicial Reconstruction
in Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv 367, 391 (2004).
47. Id. at n.172.
48. Id. at 391.
49. Although the ICTJ study suggests a distrust of the United Nations:
Suspicion and distrust of the U.N. was most evident among respondents
from the north (both Kurdish and Turkoman), who believed the U.N.'s
actions entrenched the regime's grip on power through the Oil for Food
Program. In the central and southern regions, some criticized the U.N. for
its inaction concerning human rights abuses. The U.N. is also responsible for
our suffering. (Shi'a man, Baghdad).
ICTJ, supra note 29, at 29-30 (emphasis in original).
50. Tom Periello & Marieke Wierda, International Center for Transitional
Justice, The Special Court for Sierra Leone Under Scrutiny, 14 (Apr. 2006)
[hereinafter ICTJ-SL], available at
http://www.ictj.org/static/Prosecutions/Sierra.study.pdf (visited Sept. 15, 2006).
51. ICTJ, supra note 29, at 29.
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found that most respondents felt that other Arab states profited from
the suffering of the Iraqi people." Accusations of unjust profit were
also leveled at the United Nations:
The U.N. was representing the Iraqi government .... In my
opinion, [in] these areas, which were out of the Iraqi government's
reach since 1991, the U.N. repressed our people in different ways;
they were just here for the money."
This distrust presents both a challenge and potential advantage
for hybrid tribunals in the unilateral context. Although distrust of
international organizations and regional neighbors will limit the
potential pool of international personnel available to the tribunal, the
unilateral intervention frees the tribunal from the pressure of
employing personnel representative of the international community.
At the Special Court for Sierra Leone, seven of the judges are
appointed by the U.N. Secretary-General, while only four are
appointed by the Sierra Leone government. 4 A unilateral intervener
would have far more leeway to choose personnel with greater appeal
to the local population. In East Timor, the wider pool of personnel
made available by U.N. support was irrelevant because the Timor-
Leste Minister of Justice only considered international candidates
who spoke Portuguese and were from civil law jurisdictions:"
However, this seems to be only a minor advantage in the unilateral
context, where it is unlikely that a large pool of available and willing
personnel would be available and acceptable to both the intervener
and the local population.
A failure to garner the support of international actors prior to
intervention may preclude any involvement after the intervention.
Although international legitimacy makes implementing a hybrid
tribunal more feasible, it does not ensure a stable environment in the
wake of unilateral intervention. Whether a hybrid tribunal or any
other tribunal can be implemented successfully in a violently unstable
environment is doubtful. While the inherent lack of legitimacy of
52. Id.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Art. 12, available at http://scsi-
server/sc-sl/new/documents.html (visited Oct. 25, 2006); see also http://scsl-server/sc-
sl/new/chambers.htm, (visited Oct. 25, 2006).
55. Caitlin Reiger & Marieke Wierda, International Center for Transitional
Justice, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect, 14 (Apr. 2006)
[hereinafter ICTJ-TL], available at http://www.ictj.org/static
/Prosecutions/Timor.study.pdf (visited Sept. 15, 2006).
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unilateral interventions does not preclude implementation of the
hybrid model, it exacerbates the problems that the hybrid model is
designed to solve.
B. Security Concerns
The local population is more likely to resist unilateral
intervention, a fact that exacerbates security concerns. However,
cooperative action, particularly the efforts of the United Nations, has
had great difficulty effectively intervening prior to the development
of a crisis.56 In contrast, unilateral actors may be able to avoid the
slow process of consensus building and pursue an intervention with
greater military urgency and strength. This may halt a crisis before it
matures into widespread conflict, but can have negative ramifications
for stability and hybrid tribunals. Opposing parties and the domestic
population will not be so exhausted from the conflict that the
unilateral intervention appears amenable. 7 The tenuous security
situation in Sierra Leone after the Lomd Peace Agreement led its
government to request the international community's assistance in
trying those most responsible for human rights violations. 8 The
government of Sierra Leone would not have had the opportunity to
request international legal assistance if an actor had intervened,
established its presence, and taken control of the security situation
prior to the major cessation of the conflict. The subtle difference
between requesting and merely receiving international legal
assistance has a significant impact on the domestic acceptance of the
tribunal.
Unilateral intervention is not a gradual, grassroots development,
but a sudden, cataclysmic event that causes social turmoil. The local
people who suddenly find themselves in a war zone will inevitably
focus some degree of their frustration and anguish on the occupying
forces. They will not see a tribunal as a means of addressing and
preventing abuse, but as a product and tool of an intervention that
brought with it conflicting messages of violence and liberation. These
difficulties are evident in Iraq. The IST has been the target of many
attacks, and several court personnel have been killed.59 These
56. Rwanda is a prime example.
57. See generally, I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and
Intervention in Africa (Oxford University Press, 1989).
58. ICTJ-SL, supra note 50, at 10.
59. Aamer Madhani, Kidnapped Lawyer Found Dead in Iraq, CM. TRIB., Oct.
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security issues have curtailed the tribunal's efficiency and have led
valuable staff members to leave the IST.60  The domestic and
international personnel needed to implement the hybrid model will
be less likely to participate due to this instability. The hybrid model
must distance itself from both the prior regime and the liberating
forces in order to be successful. However, critics have commented
that in Iraq, "[a]ny tribunal established on behalf of the Coalition
Provisional Authority will not be able to rid itself of the perception
and fact that it is an instrument of American power.,
61
Moreover, the intervener is faced with the difficult dilemma of
providing security while trying to provide the transparency necessary
for a hybrid tribunal to be effective. "Extreme public insecurity in
Iraq not only pushes the rule of law agenda to the backburner; it
actively undermines the privileging of justice over order."62  The
United Nations faced similar tensions in East Timor, trying to control
security in the short term and establish a viable system of self-
governance in the long term.63 The recent violence in East Timor
highlights the challenge of establishing and maintaining the security
necessary for effective transitional justice mechanisms in post-conflict
environments.' The security threats in the context of unilateral
intervention are likely to be much more serious because of resistance
to the occupation. It will be difficult for the occupying authority to
commit to a tribunal model that involves and exposes its personnel
when the risk of harm is so prevalent. In a highly unstable situation,
the needs of security will undoubtedly be privileged over the needs of
the hybrid model.
C. Regime Change
Unlike the hybrid tribunal in Sierra Leone, the target country
does not usually invite unilateral intervention.65 Instead, the unilateral
22, 2005, at 3.
60. Michael Howard, Saddam on trial "in two months," THE GUARDIAN
(London), June 1, 2005, at 16.
61. Gersh, supra note 8, at 298 (quoting Larry Kaplow, Council Plans to Form
Iraqi Tfibunal: Roadside Bomb Kills Three in Baghdad on Day Controversial Plan is
Unveiled, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 6, 2003, at A5).
62. Bali, supra note 16, at 445.
63. Katzenstein, supra note 9, at 249.
64. Mob Torches Homes In East Timor, BBC NEWS, June 28, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/5123630.stm, (visited Sept. 6, 2006).
65. Dickenson, supra note 10, at 299.
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intervention will have goals of preventing human rights violations and
regime change. This is problematic for the hybrid model, which relies
on the some domestic legal system, inadequate as it may be, that it
can interact with and develop.
International law requires occupying states to maintain the status
quo of political and legal systems.f However, there is often a push to
completely overhaul the domestic legal system in the context of
unilateral intervention and regime change.67 As was the case in Iraq,
legal systems under tyrannical leaders are liable to be corrupt or
defuncti6 "When no elected officials exist to give advice, and civil
society has been badly damaged by years of oppression and conflict,
there is no easy answer to the question of who should be consulted,
without creating an impression of bias.,
69
Ruti Teitel notes, "Legal measures during [transitional justice]
periods follow a distinctive paradigm, guided by rule of law principles
tailored to the goal of political transformation. '"70 This is evident in
Iraq where the Coalition Provisional Authority, in relation to the IST,
sought to radically restructure the legal system by excluding anyone
who had been a member of the Ba'ath party.71 The purported goal of
the exclusion was to include only legitimate domestic personnel in the
court, but the policy was based on misinformation and political
manipulation. A tribunal during a regime change is as much an
accountability mechanism as a means to constitute a new political
66. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, 36
Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also
Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 199 (2005) ("Thus,
an occupier exercises mere de facto power. For that reason it enjoys no general
legislative authority to make permanent changes to legal and political structures in
the territory").
67. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-Conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq
Special Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 327, 361-362 (2005).
68. ICTJ, supra note 29, at 33.
69. Dickenson, supra note 9, at 1069.
70. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, 213 (Oxford University Press, 2000).
71. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 48, Delegation of Authority
Regarding an Iraqi Special Tribunal, (Dec. 10, 2003), at App. A, Statute of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal, Article 33, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations
/index.html#Regulations (visited Mar. 8, 2006).
72. Ahmed Chalabi was the main proponent of the de-Ba'athification provision,
ignoring the advice of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency.
See generally, David Reiff, Blueprint for a Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at 28.
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order. As in Iraq, the intervener wants to formulate its preferred
political visions - a goal that could preclude international
involvement and domestic development. The actor pursuing regime
change will likely involve preferred personnel, not necessarily
experts, in the reconstruction and tribunal process. By contrast,
cooperative intervention must balance the interest of many actors and
will likely default to expertise. The unilateral context makes the
process more vulnerable to narrow political interests.
The Oil For Food scandal73 makes it readily apparent that the
United Nations is not above corruption. However, the increased
collaboration that collective intervention entails suggests that the
process is less susceptible to capture by individual actors. Conversely,
unilateral intervention is highly susceptible to influence by narrow
political agendas. The recent events in Iraq exemplify this trend.
Ahmed Chalabi used his influence with the Bush administration to
gain undue control over the transitional planning and political power
in Iraq.74 The resources of the Department of State and the Central
Intelligence Agency were ignored in planning for post-intervention
accountability in favor of a policy heavily influenced by Chalabi.75
Chalabi used his position as IST administrator to pressure IST
personnel to protect his partner Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shiite militia
leader who waged a rebellion against Coalition troops. 6 In 2003,
Raed Juhi, the Chief Investigative Judge of the IST, issued a warrant
for the arrest of Sadr for his involvement in the assassination of
Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei. 7 In exchange for Sadr's political
support, Ahmed Chalabi has repeatedly threatened to purge Juhi
from the tribunal, saying that he would "turn up the heat" on tribunal
officials. 78 In response to the de-Ba'athification threats, Juhi was
73. Oil-for-food scandal: Key reports, BBC NEWS, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4550859.stm (visited Oct. 23, 2006).
74. See generally, David Reiff, Blueprint for a Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, at
28; E-mail from Cherif Bassiouni, President, International Human Rights Institute,
Depaul University, to John Dermody (Nov. 4, 2005) (on file with author).
75. Retired General Says Major Mistakes Made in Iraq Occupation, Associated
Press, USA TODAY, Nov. 26, 2003, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraqj/2003-11-26-iraq-garnerx.htm (visited
Sept. 16, 2006).
76. John Burns, Ignoring US., Chalabi Pursues attempt to Fire Hussein Judge,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2005, at 12.
77. Id.
78. Id; Neil MacDonald, Saddam Tribunal Moves to Purge Ba'ath Loyalists,
Financial Times (London), July 19, 2005, at 12.
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forced to move up the trial against Hussein, adding additional
pressure to an already difficult process.79 Chalabi's abuse of the IST to
foster political alliances has undermined the capability of the
Tribunal.
The situation with Ahmed Chalabi demonstrates that, in
unilateral intervention, politically motivated actors may be preferred
at the expense of qualified personnel. Ironically, the inefficiencies of
the U.N. system may actually be beneficial. The bureaucratic,
political, and resource difficulties of the U.N.-sponsored hybrid
tribunals causes international personnel to work in less than ideal
circumstances, often sacrificing more lucrative career options. These
difficulties have made recruitment difficult and limited participation
to personnel dedicated to transitional justice. In contrast, personnel
seeking predominantly political advancement are more likely to
participate in the context of unilateral intervention.
D. Domestic Constraints on Unilateral Actors
The most significant problem for any hybrid tribunal is a lack of
resources and support.8 However, the constraints that domestic
politics impose on unilateral actors poses a further problem for hybrid
tribunals. According to a former prosecutor for Sierra Leone, the
ideal length of a hybrid tribunal is five years, but a chaotic security
environment can create significant delays." Because of the economic
and political expenses of unilateral intervention, there is increased
pressure to provide accountability quickly and cheaply. While hybrid
tribunals have been cheaper than ad hoc tribunals, they still entail
considerable expense. The budget for the Special Court for Sierra
Leone was $34 million in 2003/2004, $29.9 million in 2004/2005 and is
projected to be $25.5 million in 2005/2006. 2 Without support from
other international actors, the economic burden may be too great and
effective accountability may be sacrificed. Hybrid tribunals do not
offer a cheaper kind of justice and their benefits can only be realized
79. John Burns, Hussein Jousts with Iraqi Judge Over his Rights in a Court
Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2005, at 10.
80. Katzenstein, supra note 9, at 257-58.
81. David Crane, Dancing with the Devil: Prosecuting West Africa's Warlords.-
Building Initial Prosecutorial Strategy for an International Tribunal after Third
World Armed Conflicts, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (2005).
82. Special Court for Sierra Leone, Budget 2005-2006, 1, available at




Political constraints present a far greater problem. The
unilateral actor must act while political capital is available. This does
not necessarily translate to a means or timing of intervention best
designed to meet the needs of the transitional context. Instead of
allowing appropriate time for sanctions or development of local
resources and knowledge, the intervention is at the mercy of the
domestic political agenda. Instead of garnering support from multiple
actors whose varied political structures would allow continual effort, a
unilateral intervention reflects only the domestic political timing of
the intervener. The international element of the hybrid model
requires international participation that may not be feasible if the
unilateral intervener is under domestic pressure to cease its
presence." This concern is particularly salient in light of the delays
and burgeoning costs that have plagued the tribunal in Sierra Leone."
Shifting domestic politics, without an alternative international
presence to rely on, places the feasibility of the hybrid tribunal in
doubt.
E. Pursuit of Suspects
The inability of the hybrid tribunals to bring those most
responsible before them significantly impacts accountability.
However, the recent transfer of Charles Taylor to the custody of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone suggests that a hybrid tribunal can
gain custody of high profile criminals despite lacking U.N. Chapter
VII powers.86
A great number of individuals suspected of committing atrocities
in East Timor fled to Indonesia. Unfortunately, the tribunal in East
Timor was unable to prosecute these suspects because Indonesia
refused to turn them over to the tribunal.7 This is attributable both
to the desire of East Timorese leadership to re-establish ties with
Indonesia and a reluctance by Indonesian authorities to address the
83. Cockayne, supra note 9, at 663.
84. Id. at 632.
85. Id. at 626.
86. Charles Taylor was taken into custody March 29, 2006 after trying to flee his
asylum in Nigeria. See James Copnall, A sombre Charles Taylor faces court, BBC
NEWS, April 3, 2006, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4874142.stm
(visited Oct. 24, 2006)
87. Katzenstein, supra note 9, at 251-52.
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atrocities." The decision not to imbue the Special Court with Chapter
VII powers shows that the United Nations has lacked the strength
and desire to force compliance with the tribunals.89 The United
Nation's lack of power has negatively impacted the effectiveness of
the tribunals as "[t]he impunity by which these warlords move about
a region unmolested, or with little accountability, breeds a lack of
respect by the populace for the rule of law."' Unilateral intervention
has a distinct advantage in this regard. If the unilateral actor has the
strength to pursue an intervention, it can likely pressure states
harboring suspects in whom the tribunal is interested. A hegemonic
actor will have significantly more ability to exert pressure than the
United Nations, constrained by political and institutional reluctance.
Prior to recent events, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was
unable to gain custody of Charles Taylor because Nigeria, a managing
partner for the court, harbored him and prevented his extradition."
However, the United States, the largest donor to the Special Court,
exerted significant political pressure in an attempt to bring Taylor to
justice. The election of Liberian president Ellen Johnon-Sirleaf in
January of 2006 presented an opportunity for the region to adopt a
new approach towards extraditing Taylor.' In a decision likely
influenced by political pressure and promises of aid from the United
States, Taylor was successfully transferred to the custody of the
Special Court.93
It remains to be seen whether the Taylor example will become
the rule or exception with regard to the ability of hybrid tribunals to
gain custody over high-level suspects. Regardless, the significant
influence of the United States in apprehending Taylor highlights the
potential advantages of unilateral action and makes the failure of the
East Timor tribunal to prosecute significant suspects even more
glaring. Successful prosecution of those most responsible for
atrocities appears to come about where a hybrid tribunal is supported
88. ICTJ-TL, supra note 55, at 2.
89. Although the alternative may have been no tribunal at all. The lack of
Chapter VII enforcement powers was likely a significant factor in the negotiations
that created the Special Court.
90. Crane, supra note 81, at 4.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Liberia Press Relief Over Taylor Capture, BBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2006,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4860352.stm, (visited Sept. 16, 2006).
93. Martin Plaut, Charles Taylor Arrest Drama, BBC NEWS, Mar. 29, 2006,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4858500.stm (visited Sept. 16, 2006).
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by a global hegemon rather than a multilateral body such as the
United Nations.
V. Can the Promise of Hybrid Tribunals be Realized?
If, a hybrid tribunal can be implemented despite the significant
impediments of the unilateral context, will it be able to realize its
theoretical advantages? A hybrid model after unilateral intervention
will likely not feature the degree of international involvement present
in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo. Although it is possible
that, despite the difficulties, a U.N.-sponsored hybrid tribunal could
be employed in the wake of unilateral intervention, it is more likely
that a model similar to the IST will be used. While the IST is not a
hybrid tribunal, the United States has provided significant technical,
evidentiary, and legal support." The United Kingdom has also
performed several training sessions for court judges and staff.9 Were
a hybrid model employed, it would likely be comprised of select
international and domestic staff reflecting the interests of the
intervening state. If the hybrid tribunal assumes a less than ideal
hybrid structure, can the hybrid model's promise of increased
legitimacy, capacity development, and international norm diffusion
still be realized?
A. Legitimacy
The advantages of locating the tribunal domestically may be less
effective in the context of unilateral intervention, particularly during
regime change. National identities are in flux during this period and a
local court may operate as a symbol of divisive ownership rather than
local control. As attacks on the IST demonstrate, a court associated
with an occupying power will be a target of resistance. 96 A tribunal
that is forced into chaos by instability and attacks will suffer a decline
in both international and domestic legitimacy.
94. Neil Lewis, David Johnston, The Struggle for Iraq: War Crimes; U.S. Team Is
Sent to Develop Case in Hussein Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at 11, available at
2004 WLNR 5462791.
95. Kathryn Westcott, Trials Loom For Iraq s Former Rulers, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4401137.stm (visited Sept. 16, 2006).
96. The lawyer of one of Hussein's co-defendants was killed in October and the
body was found in the Shiite enclave in the Ur district of Baghdad, an area controlled
by the militia loyal Moqtada al-Sadr Aamer Madhani, Kidnapped Lawyer Found
Dead in Iraq, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 22, 2005, at 3, available at 2005 WLNR
23446827.
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A tribunal located abroad would sacrifice the tenuous pursuit of
local ownership in favor of a more stable but removed process.
However, a study of the ICTY concluded that its removal from the
local population had a significant negative impact on awareness and
legitimacy.97 Surveys of Iraqis suggest that the presence of a domestic
or hybrid tribunal is desirable even in the context of unilateral
intervention9 As one Iraqi commented, "The trials should be public,
in front of the people, so that they feel that they have truly been
liberated and that their rights have been returned to them by those
who stole them." 99
While a local tribunal provides the benefit of local ownership,
this interest must be balanced with the legitimacy lost if security
concerns prevent the tribunal from functioning efficiently. The
Special Court for Sierra Leone has opted to try Taylor in The Hague
using Special Court laws and personnel due to the security threat that
Taylor poses.' ° It remains to be seen what impact removing Taylor
from Sierra Leone will have on the legitimacy of the Special Court.
Taylor's removal may further isolate the Special Court from a local
legal community that already perceives the court as a largely
international institution.°  Moving towards a model that
institutionalizes the less than ideal relationship between the ICTY
and the Kosovo tribunals could be detrimental for the Special Court's
legitimacy. However, if the trial against Taylor is successful and
widely accepted in Sierra Leone, it may signal the evolution of a new
transitional justice system where major perpetrators of human rights
violations are tried in The Hague in conjunction with satellite
tribunals located in the country of conflict.
Varying standards of justice, particularly related to the death
penalty, highlight the disparity between international and domestic
legitimacy. International and hybrid tribunals have declined to
incorporate the death penalty as a punishment. As hybrid tribunals
generally try those most responsible, the greatest perpetrators of
97. The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic,
University of California, Berkeley, and the Centre for Human Rights, University of
Sarajevo, Report: Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview
Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 102, 144 (2000).
98. ICTJ, supra note 29, at 31.
99. Id. at 25.
100. UN. Agrees Taylor Trial Transfer, BBC NEWS, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5088646.stm (visited Sept. 16, 2006).
101. ICTJ-SL, supra note 50, at 2.
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crimes are granted international levels of due process without having
to worry about the death penalty. At the same time, lower level
members tried in domestic courts are subject to lower procedural
standards and the death penalty.'2 This exacerbates the tension
between international and domestic standards which the hybrid
model is theoretically designed to mitigate. Further, local
populations may prefer the death penalty and see its absence as an
illegitimate imposition of international standards.' 3 Many Iraqis do
not share the international community's need to provide Hussein and
the Ba'ath party with fair trials. Instead, surveys of Iraqi people
indicate a preference for Hussein to meet justice via a system
commensurate to what he employed. One Iraqi noted, "I would like
to say that I support and agree with human rights principles, but not
for these criminals."'1°
A potential advantage of unilateral action is that a tribunal need
not necessarily apply international standards. Although a hybrid is
dependent upon a mixture of international personnel, a court of
international personnel willing to apply the death penalty could
conceivably be assembled. The unilateral context enjoys greater
freedom from international pressure and could adopt the death
penalty where it is likely to promote local ownership.
The competence and impartiality of the international personnel
is another source of legitimacy, and is severely complicated by
unilateral intervention. As discussed before, finding qualified
personnel to work in the aftermath of an unilateral intervention will
be difficult. The available personnel will likely lack the necessary
independence from the occupying country to provide substantial
legitimacy. Judicial impartiality is difficult to establish even in the
multilateral context. UNMIK's executive control over judicial
matters in Kosovo has contributed to a detrimental perception of the
independence of international judges.' Ouestions of judicial
impartiality will only be exacerbated in the context of unilateral
intervention.
Adequate management of the tribunal is necessary to protect the
102. An anecdotal example is that Sierra Leonean prisoners at the Pademba
prison in Freetown must have their families feed them because they are not provided
regular meals. In contrast, the prisoners at the Special Court enjoy modern facilities
and not only receive food, but have been sharing that food with their families.
103. ICTJ, supra note 29, at 34-35.
104. Id at 27.
105. ICTJ-K, supra note 44, at 2.
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tribunal's independence and prevent political pressure from tainting
the process. One of the primary reasons for the success of the court
in Sierra Leone has been the independent management of the
Registrar, which is free from U.N. administrative rules."" Similarly,
provisions in the IST statute insulate it from the influence of the Iraqi
government. 7 However, these provisions did not prevent the United
States from placing Chalabi on the court, but instead allow Chalabi to
occupy a position of power free from political checks."° The presence
of personnel preferred by the United States has greatly undercut the
legitimacy of the IST.' °9
Although hybrid tribunals have alleviated some impartiality
concerns in places such as Kosovo,"" adopting a hybrid model does
not guarantee that there will be sufficient separation between the
interests of an unilateral actor and the interests of the tribunal. Each
transitional situation offers unique challenges, and structures
designed to protect a tribunal's independence are ultimately
counterproductive when unreliable personnel populate the tribunal.
B. Capacity
Perhaps the most lauded promise of hybrid tribunals is their
ability to develop domestic legal capability: that "[t]he side-by-side
working arrangements allow for on-the-job training that may prove
more effective than abstract classroom discussions of formal legal
rules and principles. ' .. However, capacity building is not an easy or
predictable process and pragmatism should temper expectations.
112
As Iraq demonstrates, the rhetoric used in unilateral intervention is
106. Cockayne, supra note 9, at 629-30.
107. Coalition Provisional Authority, supra note 70, at Statute of the Iraqi Special
Tribunal, Article 1 ("The tribunal shall be an independent entity and not associated
with any Iraqi government departments").
108. Hannah Allam, Abandoned by U.S., Iraqi Politician's Star Shines Again,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE Aug. 14, 2005, at A27, available at 2005 WLNR 24628091;
Hannah Allam, Chalabi's Makeover Places Him Near Top, SEATTLE TIMES, July 31,
2005, at A12, available at 2005 WLNR 12058117.
109. David Holley, The World, Arrest Warrant Issued for Chalabi, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 19759439; Bassiouni, supra note 67, at
371.
110. Dickenson, supra note 10, at 306.
111. Id. at 307.
112. Varda Hussain, Note: Sustaining Judicial Rescues.: The Role of Outreach and




not prone to understatement. The goals of the intervention and
promise for results are exaggerated to cultivate support, but are not
necessarily achieved. A hybrid tribunal, while laudable in its efforts,
simply cannot single-handedly reform a domestic legal system. This is
exacerbated in a unilateral context. A "military administration
relying principally on its monopoly of force to administer [a post-
conflict situation] is unlikely to yield robust local institutions capable
of maintaining stability or commanding legitimacy.""
3
Interaction with the domestic legal system has been limited even
in Sierra Leone, where the local population has been far more
receptive to the tribunal. The Sierra Leone Bar Association expected
a high degree of participation in the Special Court, but the limited
amount of positions led to disappointment."4 Several Sierra Leonean
lawyers left the Special Court in response to the dynamic of the court,
further inhibiting the capacity potential of the hybrid model."5
The lack of a functional domestic legal system and the unilateral
actor's desire to control the accountability process will result in less
collaboration. Sierra Leone and East Timor demonstrate that
interaction between international and domestic staff has had difficulty
fostering development even in the non-unilateral context."6 The
heavy involvement of the United States Regime Crime Liaison Office
in the operations of the IST"7 suggests that the dominance of
international staff will be even more pronounced where international
involvement is explicitly mandated.
Moreover, as critics point out, it seems naively optimistic to
contend that the experiences of a few people in a trial of limited
scope can significantly impact the development of the domestic legal
system.18 A report on the capacity building potential of the Sierra
Leone Special Court suggests that "despite verbal commitments that
the hybrid tribunal will 'leave something behind for the people,' no
benefits - aside from a new courtroom and prison facility - will accrue
without a strategic implementation of these norms."" 9 While hybrid
tribunals may retain a "demonstration effect" by their very presence,
113. Bali, supra note 16,434.
114. ICTJ-SL, supra note 50, at 38.
115. Id at 22.
116. Katzenstein, supra note 9, at 256-57.
117. Neil MacDonald, et al., Saddam's Family Rebuilds Defence Team,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug 10, 2005, at 9.
118. Gersh, supra note 8, at 292-293.
119. Hussain, supra note 112, at 572.
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the pressures of unilateral intervention will negatively impact
outreach programs and limit the hybrid model's ability to fulfill the
promise of increasing the capacity of the local legal system.
Regardless of expertise, effort and good intentions, transitional
justice is an inherently difficult process. The goal is not to find a
solution to the problem, but to find an approach that is most effective
at mitigating the various difficulties. A preferable option in unilateral
intervention, where time and resources are scarce, is not to burden
the accountability process with the demand of domestic legal
development. While a hybrid tribunal may help that process, it
should not be the primary mechanism for domestic legal
development. Development measures that build upon the tribunal's
work, as well as development measures aimed solely at the domestic
legal system, are critical to developing the rule of law. Particularly in
the context of unilateral intervention, capacity development should
not be a significant factor in choosing a hybrid model.
C International Norm diffusion
Diffusing international norms is the advantage of hybrid
tribunals most weakened by unilateral intervention. Although hybrid
tribunals potentially represent a "powerful model through which
national and international legal systems [communicate and influence]
one another,"'2 unilateral intervention significantly undercuts this
pathway of influence. Unlike the United Nations, international
governance and uniform international law are unlikely to be priorities
for an unilateral intervener. It is paradoxical to expect unilateral
action in violation of international law to serve as a potent source for
international norm diffusion.
It is not apparent that the previous international tribunals have
had success in spreading international standards of due process and
fairness."' Norms can be diffused by directly incorporating
international standards into domestic law and practice, and through
interaction between elite actors. 122 The reluctance by international
staff to learn local languages has likely reduced norm diffusion
120. William Burke-White, Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of Norms in
International Law Symposium: Article: International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 963, 976-977 (2004).
121. Katzenstein, supra note 10, at 253.




through interaction between international and domestic personnel.'23
While international and domestic personnel will certainly interact in a
hybrid tribunal, the unilateral context will likely limit positive aspects
of the interaction. The less than ideal relationships between
international and domestic personnel in East Timor and Sierra Leone
suggest that mere institutionalized interaction is not sufficient. The
relationships must be positive and sustained to significantly diffuse
international norms and avoid domestic resistance to such norms.
The direct diffusion of international norms is only effective to the
extent that there is a legal system available and willing to receive
international norms. Tribunals, particularly those in an unresponsive
environment, may not be the best mechanism for international norm
diffusion. The lack of a fully functioning justice system combined
with poor training standards in East Timor led to a poor infusion of
international norms, despite a heavy reliance on international
standards and practices.' 24 The absence of a staged handover plan in
East Timor further limited the impact of international norms.'
International norm diffusion will suffer where, like Iraq, there are
significant difficulties establishing a new regime and transferring
power. International norms will not be inculcated domestically
without a stable legal system. Where international norms are
transferred, the lack of long term stability and political direction will
limit the enduring presence of the standards.
. Although the Special Court for Sierra Leone has contributed to
international law jurisprudence with respect to head of state
immunity,1 26 the impact upon the domestic legal system has been
significantly less. Substantive legal reform and the implementation of
international standards in the domestic legal system of Sierra Leone
has had less to do with the direct effects of the Special Court and is
more attributable to the efforts of civil society.'" With heightened
security concerns in an unilateral intervention, civil society
participation will be curtailed. International norm diffusion will
suffer without civil society to build upon the work of a hybrid
tribunal,.
The priority in unilateral intervention will not likely be to spread
123. ICTJ-TL, supra note 55, at 16.
124. Id. at 25.
125. Id.
126. ICTJ-SL, supra note 50, at 18.
127. Id. at 39.
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international norms, but to provide for stability and accountability in
the fastest and cheapest manner possible. Local law will be used only
to the extent that it does not conflict with international human rights
norms, as was the case in other tribunals. The compromise will not be
between local law and international norms, but rather between local
norms and the norms of the unilateral intervener.
VI. Conclusion
Unilateral intervention does not exclude the hybrid model as an
option for legal accountability, but it does make it a more tenuous
choice. The resources and time needed to employ a hybrid model will
likely preclude its use after unilateral intervention. The necessary
personnel and resources will be more difficult to acquire without
international legitimacy. An unilateral actor may be better able to
tailor the hybrid tribunal to meet local needs by incorporating the
death penalty or selecting preferable personnel. Additionally, the
military strength required to undertake unilateral intervention may
the apprehension of suspects and encourage the compliance of the
states. However, these advantages cannot compensate for the
negative impact that unilateral intervention will have on the
purported advantages of the hybrid model. Without a heightened
ability to provide legitimacy, capacity build, and diffuse international
norms, the advantages of hybrid tribunals over other accountability
models are undermined.
No approach to transitional justice can smoothly resolve conflict
or eliminate underlying political, economic, and ethnic tensions.
Each post-conflict environment presents dynamic and unique
challenges that cannot be addressed through a formulaic and rigid
approach. The hybrid model is the best form of accountability only
when there is long-term financial and political commitment to the
success of its efforts. The nature of unilateral intervention, with its
needs for expediency and susceptibility to ulterior political interests,
limits the effectiveness of the hybrid model. However, this should not
be seen as a failure of the hybrid model, but as a failure to pursue
unilateral intervention in a manner that will best serve the people it is
intended to help. Accountability mechanisms are a necessity for post-
conflict stability and development. Although hybrid tribunals may
not be feasible after unilateral intervention, they nevertheless
represent a significant development in the continual effort to meet
the needs of transitional justice.
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